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WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
The majority's confusion with the use of a temporary custody order
can be traced to a lack of clarity in the UCCJA itself.43 A strict reading
of the UCCJA does not allow a state to assert jurisdiction and tempora-
rily enjoin enforcement of a custody order.44 Nevertheless, since the
UCCJA's adoption, it has become evident that courts are often asked to
enforce orders which are not based on complete records and which are
not in the child's best interest. 45 In response to this problem the sugges-
tion has been made that the present emergency provision of the UCCJA
be replaced by one that would expressly allow a court to issue a tempo-
rary order pending litigation in the proper forum. 4 6 Such a provision
would allow a state to insure that custody is based on an informed deci-
sion without sacrificing the UCCJA's goal of eliminating concurrent ju-
risdiction.4 7 Though the Mullins court extended the UCCJA beyond
previous interpretations, it did serve the best interest of the child by in-
suring that the custody of Carl Otis Mullins was based on an informed
decision.4
8
Corporations-DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE ENTITY-Victoria Eleva-
tor Co. v. Meriden Grain Co., 283 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 1979).
The corporation is the cornerstone of the American economic struc-
ture.' Through incorporation, investors can combine capital and reap
the profits that derive from economies of scale.2 Because of its integral
emergency constituted an implicit challenge to the California custody decree. 298 N.W.2d
at 62.
43. See supra note 33.
44. Id
45. See, e.g., Fry v. Ball, 190 Colo. 128, 544 P.2d 402 (1975).
46. See Note, supra note 11, at 616-20.
47. Id
48. The court ordered evidentiary hearing in Minnesota resulted in the Krolick's con-
tinued custody of the child with visitation rights afforded to the father. Minneapolis Trib-
une, Sept. 13, 1981, at 113.
1. See Congdon v. Congdon, 160 Minn. 343, 373, 200 N.W. 76, 87 (1924) (corpora-
tions are of "utmost importance" to industrial world and "essential to the welfare of busi-
ness interests"); H. BALENTINE, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § I (rev. ed. 1946); Note,
Disregard of the Corporate Entity, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 333, 334-36 (1978) (acceptance
of corporate device by American business has resulted in phenomenal industrial growth).
One leading commentator has stated that "[b]ecause of its size, power, and import, the
modern business corporation is a key institution in contemporary society and in the Amer-
ican free enterprise profit system--somewhat analogous to the feudal system of old." H.
HENN. HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
§ 1, at 4 (2d ed. 1970).
2. See generally H. HENN, supra note 1, § 1, at 4. For a general discussion of the
history and effect of incorporation, see I W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
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role in business and industry, the corporation has attained a favored sta-
tus in the law. 3 The law surrounding the creation and legal status of a
corporation has two essential characteristics. First, liability of sharehold-
ers is limited to their capital investment.4 Second, a corporation is
treated as a separate legal entity, distinct from its shareholders.
5
Exceptions to the principles of limited liability and separate corporate
existence evolved in the early part of the twentieth century.6 The equita-
3. A corporation is generally regarded as a "person" unless the relevant constitu-
tional or statutory provision is limited in application to natural persons. Thus, for exam-
ple, under the United States Constitution a corporation enjoys the right of the "people" to
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, U.S. CONST. amend. IV, the right
not to be deprived of liberty or property without due process, U.S. CONST. amend. V, and
the right to equal protection of the laws, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. This status is accom-
panied by a corresponding responsibility to act in the public interest; thus a corporation's
acts are governed by public policy, as are any other person's. See Villainen v. American
Finnish Workers Soc'y, 236 Minn. 412,416, 53 N.W.2d 112, 115 (1952). See generall Note,
supra note 1.
4. Limited liability of shareholders, an important feature of modern corporations,
has not always been a corporate attribute. See Dodd, The Ewlution of Limited Liability in
American Indiarsry: Massachuatts, 61 HARv. L. REV. 1351-53 (1948). For a history of the
concept of limited liability in Minnesota, see Note, supra note 1, at 334-35 n.5. Today,
however, limited liability is the fundamental rule of corporate law. See Anderson v. Ab-
bott, 321 U.S. 349, 361-63 (1944).
The feature of limited liability for corporate shareholders has been both responsible
and necessary for attracting the large amounts of capital required to establish many cor-
porations. Without limited liability modern business would not have experienced the vast
growth that it enjoyed in the last century. See generally I. WORMERS, DISREGARD OF THE
CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATE PROBLEMS 2-3 (1927); Ballantine, Stock-
holders'Liahility in Minesota, 7 MiNN. L. REv. 79, 79-80 (1923).
5. See, e.g. ,J.J. McCaskill Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 504, 514-15 (1910); Trustees
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 636 (1819); United States v.
Martin, 337 F.2d 171, 175 (8th Cir. 1964); Milwaukee Motor Transp. Co. v. Commis-
sioner of Taxation, 292 Minn. 66, 71, 193 N.W.2d 605, 608 (1971); Gallagher v. Germania
Brewing Co., 53 Minn. 214, 219-20, 54 N.W. 1115, 1116-17 (1893).
In the last 150 years, courts have agreed that a corporation is an entity separate from
its shareholders, but they have been unable to agree on the exact nature of a corporation.
In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), the Court
perceived the corporation as an "artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
the contemplation of the law." Id at 303 (4 Wheat. at 636). Since then, courts have
generally considered a corporation to be either a legal entity or a legal fiction. The Min-
nesota Supreme Court has not been consistent in characterizing the nature of the corpo-
rate structure. Compare In re Clarke's Will, 204 Minn. 154, 157-58, 284 N.W. 876, 878
(1939) (legal entity) with Prudential Ins. Co. v. A. Enkema Holding Co., 196 Minn. 154,
157-58, 264 N.W. 576, 578 (1936) (legal fiction). See generally 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2,
§§ 1, 5; Note, Shareholder Liabilit--Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. . Haoy Fund-Raising Man-
agement, Inc.-A Single-Factor Test?, 3 J. CORP. L. 219 (1977); Comment, Disregard the Corpo-
rate Entity. Contract Claims, 28 OHIo ST. L.J. 441 (1967); Note, supra note 1, at 334.
6. As the law of corporations developed and the principle of limited liability became
firmly entrenched, abuses of the corporate form created a need for disregarding the sepa-
rate nature of the corporation. See Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1944); New
Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 442 (1934); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v.
Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490, 501 (1918); J.J. McCaskill Co. v.
19821
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ble remedy of disregarding the corporate entity and imposing personal
liability on individual shareholders was judicially created to redress in-
justices perpetrated through the corporate form. 7 Originally, the corpo-
rate entity was disregarded only in instances of fraud.8 However, under
capitalization, 9 failure to observe corporate formalities,o and identity of
United States, 216 U.S. 504, 514-15 (1910). These cases generally disregarded the corpo-
rate entity when there was an overriding public policy at stake, such as the need to pay
corporate creditors or to compensate victims of tortious conduct. See generally Dobbyn, .4
Practical Approach to Consistency in Veil-Percing Cases, 19 U. KAN. L. REV. 185, 185-86
(1971).
7. See H. BALANTINE, supra note 1, § 122. The remedy of corporate disregard is not
limited to situations where corporate assets fail to satisfy creditors. See Note, supra note 1,
at 365-69 (discussing application of disregard doctrine to cases involving probate adminis-
tration, attempted evasion of statutes, and disputes among shareholders). In Reopke v.
Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 302 N.W.2d 350 (Minn. 1981), a recent no-fault stacking
case, the Minnesota Supreme Court used a "reverse pierce" of the corporate entity theory
in holding that a decedent, who was president and sole shareholder of a corporation, was
an insured under six no-fault policies that covered vehicles owned by the corporation.
The theory allowed the decedent and corporation to be treated as a single entity. Id at
353.
8. This is particularly true in Minnesota. See Ahlm v. Rooney, 274 Minn. 259, 264,
143 N.W.2d 65, 69 (1966) (mere dominance of corporation by single shareholder not
enough to hold shareholder personally liable for debts); Whitney v. Leighton, 225 Minn.
1, 8, 30 N.W.2d 329, 333 (1947) (fraud only basis to disregard corporate entity), aft'don
rehearing, 225 Minn. 12, 30 N.W.2d 335 (1948); Fewell v. Tappen, 223 Minn. 483, 495, 27
N.W.2d 648, 655 (1947) (corporate entity not a veil for fraud); Central Motors & Supply
Co. v. Brown, 219 Minn. 467, 469-70, 18 N.W.2d 236, 237 (1945) (existence of fraud justi-
fied liability); Lake Park Dev. Co. v. Paul Steenberg Constr. Co., 201 Minn. 396, 400-01,
276 N.W. 651, 654 (1937) (appropriation by officer of corporate assets not a basis of liabil-
ity, the assets being taken pursuant to officers authority); Prudential Ins. Co. v. A. Enkema
Holding Co., 196 Minn. 154, 157-58, 264 N.W. 576, 578 (1936) (fraud or strong equitable
claim only basis to disregard separate entity nature of the corporation). But see Manufac-
turers Bldg., Inc. v. Heller, 306 Minn. 180, 183, 235 N.W.2d 825, 827 (1975) (corporate
entity disregarded despite absence of fraud), noted in 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 293
(1977); In re Clarke's Will, 204 Minn. 574, 579, 284 N.W. 876, 879 (1939) (disregard con-
cept "serves no purpose"). See generally Note, supra note 1, at 338-39.
9. See Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944); Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576,
364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961); Erickson v. Minnesota & Ontario Power Co., 134
Minn. 209, 158 N.W. 979 (1916). In Erickson liability was imposed on a parent corpora-
tion because a subsidiary corporation was inadequately capitalized. Although the court's
rationale was based on agency principles rather than corporate disregard law, id at 214,
158 N.W. at 981, the subsidiary corporation's undercapitalization was a result of the par-
ent company's actions. Some observers suggest that courts are more likely to disregard the
corporate entity in cases where liability will be imposed on a corporate, rather than indi-
vidual, shareholder. See H. HENN, supra note 1, §§ 147-148, E. LATrY, SUBSIDIARIES AND
AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 194-95 (1936); Note, supra note 1, at 342.
10. Corporate disregard principles based on failure to observe corporate formalities
are often called the "Massachusetts" rule. Dobbyn,supra note 6, at 186, 189. Jurisdictions
following the Massachusetts rule emphasize the formal barriers that segregate the corpora-
tion from the shareholders. Id at 186; see, e.g., My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland
Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 233 N.E.2d 748 (1968). See generally W. FLETCHER,supra note
2, § 41-42; Note, supra note 1, at 339-40.
[Vol. 8
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interest between shareholders and the corporation1 ' have also served as
justification for imposing personal liability on individual shareholders.
Corporate disregard law balances two competing interests: the limita-
tion of the corporate shareholders' liability and the satisfaction of the
corporation's creditors.12 The equitable nature of corporate disregard
law lends itself to decisions based on standards of fairness and justice
rather than on a structured method of analysis. 13
In Victonia Elevator Co. v. Meriden Grain Co. 14 the Minnesota Supreme
Court recognized the "instrumentality" or "alter ego" theory of corpo-
rate disregard law.' 5 Under this theory, eight factors are considered in
determining whether to disregard the corporate entity. 16 The Victoria El-
evator court applied the eight-factor test and held that fraud was not nec-
essary to disregard the corporate entity.' 7 The court also held that the
failure to treat the corporation as a separate legal entity, when coupled
with the element of fundamental unfairness or injustice, provides suffi-
cient basis to impose personal liability on shareholders.' 8
Defendant Harold D. Schroeder and his wife were the sole sharehold-
ers of the Meridan Grain Company.19 The Schroeders owned most of
11. The emphasis in this approach is on the similarity between the financial interests
of the controlling shareholder and those of the corporation. California and New York
have similar approaches in that both states look to whether the relationship between the
shareholder and the corporation is one of complete control or unity of financial benefit.
See Dobbyn, supra note 6, at 186-87; Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
Rosen v. E.C. Losch Co., 234 Cal. App. 2d 324, 44 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1965); Zaist v. Olson,
154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967); Walkovszky v. Carlton, 24 A.D.2d 582, 262 N.Y.S.2d
334 (1965); Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 247 A.D. 144, 287 N.Y.S. 62 (1936).
12. Dobbyn, supra note 6, at 186-87.
13. See Dobbyn, supra note 6, at 185-86. One court stated that "it is well nigh impos-
sible in the present state of the law to enunciate a clear cut rule." Hazeltine Corp. v.
General Elec. Co., 19 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D. Md. 1937). There is no general formula for all
cases. Doctrinal concepts are of limited value; each case must be decided upon its own
peculiar facts. See H. BALIANTNE, supra note 1, § 122.
14. 283 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 1979).
15. Id. at 512. The Victon;z Elevator court did not distinguish between the instrumen-
tality theory and the alter ego theory. Id; see also White v. Jorgenson, 322 N.W.2d 607
(Minn. 1982). The theory adopted in Vitona Evator, however, has broader application
than the alter ego theory developed by the California and New York courts, which em-
phasizes the unity of financial interest between a shareholder and the corporation. See
supra note 11.
16. See infta note 31 and accompanying text. The source of the eight-factor test was
DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 686-87 (4th Cir.
1976). The Minnesota Supreme Court's reliance on a Fourth Circuit decision was proba-
bly due to the lack of similar precedent in Minnesota corporate disregard law.
17. 283 N.W.2d at 512.
18. Id
19. Id at 510-11. Defendant Schroeder was a farmer until 1959, when he went into
business selling feed, seed, and other farm-related products under the name of "Schroe-
der's Cashway." In 1969, defendant and two others entered into an agreement to form a
corporation called Meriden Grain Company, Inc. Under the agreement, Schroeder was to
1982]
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the property used by the corporation in conducting its business. 20
Schroeder never charged, and the corporation never paid, any rent for
the use of the land and equipment. 2 1 The property, however, was listed
as an asset of the corporation on Meriden's tax returns and financial
statements. 2 2 The corporation took deductions for depreciation, taxes,
and insurance on this property on its 1971 and 1972 tax returns. 23
The action arose after the Victoria Elevator Company had entered
into a series of fourteen contracts with the Meriden Grain Company.
Meriden was to deliver corn to the Victoria Elevator Company24 and
had partially performed only one of the fourteen contracts when Victoria
sued Meridan for breach of the unperformed contracts.25 By the time
Victoria recovered a default judgment, Meriden had already ceased do-
ing business. Shortly after the default judgment was entered, all of Vic-
toria's corporate assets were transferred to defendant Schroeder and his
wife.26 Although no evidence was presented showing that the corpora-
tion had been dissolved, no corporate assets remained from which to sat-
isfy Victoria's judgment.2 7 Victoria therefore obtained a subsequent
judgment holding Schroeder personally liable for the default judgment
entered against Meriden.28 The sole issue on appeal was whether, absent
transfer assets held by Schroeder's Cashway to the new corporation in return for shares.
In 1970, defendant and his wife were issued shares of the corporation, ostensibly in return
for cash and inventory. Although corporate records did reflect cash contributions, there
was no evidence of machinery or equipment transfers to the corporation. The other two
parties to the agreement never made a capital contribution to the corporation or received
stock. Id




23. Id This "error" was corrected on the corporation's 1973 tax return. Schroeder
testified that the corporation never paid any taxes on the property. Id
24. Id The contracts called for delivery of the corn between May and November
1973.
25. In the fall of 1973, before plaintiff filed suit, a dispute arose between plaintiff and
defendant regarding the failure to perform. Two meetings were held at which Schroeder,
on behalf of the corporation, promised to deliver the remaining grain, and plaintiff ten-
dered payment of the $28,000 it had been holding because of delays in performance. The
contracts, however, were not completed. Id
26. Id The assets consisted of a grain leg and storage bin. These transfers were ap-
proved at special meetings of the stockholders and board of directors. Schroeder and his
wife were the sole members of each of these bodies.
27. Id Prior to the default judgment, Schroeder withdrew money from the corpora-
tion, allegedly as wages, in spite of Meriden's financial difficulties. Id at 512-13. Schroe-
der withdrew $39,997 from the corporate checking account on May 31, 1973. The check
was recorded as payment of wages, with interest, for October 1970 through July 1, 1973.
The amount was not listed on Schroeder's 1973 individual income tax returns as wages
received or on Meriden's 1973 corporate income tax returns as salary paid out. Id at 513
n.7.
28. Id at 510. The judgment against Schroeder individually was in favor of Victoria
[Vol. 8
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a showing of fraud, plaintiff could recover from defendant Schroeder in
his individual capacity. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's order and held Schroeder personally liable.29
In Victoria Elevator the Minnesota Supreme Court approved the instru-
mentality theory of corporate disregard law as the first prong of a two-
prong test for determining whether to disregard the corporate entity.30
The eight factors considered significant in corporate disregard cases
under the instrumentality theory are insufficient capitalization, failure to
observe corporate formalities, nonpayment of dividends, insolvency of
the debtor corporation at the time of the transaction in question, siphon-
ing of corporate funds by the dominant shareholder, nonfunctioning of
other officers and directors, absence of corporate records, and use of the
corporation as a facade for individual dealings. 3 l The Victoria Elevator
court held that not only must "a number of these factors be present,"32
but an element of injustice or unfairness, the second prong, is also neces-
sary to impose personal liability on shareholders.
33
The eight factors provide evidentiary guidelines for courts and liti-
gants in applying the instrumentality theory. In Victoria Elevator, for ex-
ample, the evidence showed that Schroeder "failed to make formal
distinctions between corporate and individual property," 34 with the re-
sult that Meriden was deemed to have operated as a mere facade for
Schroeder's individual dealings. 35 No corporate records of transfers of
personal cash and property to the corporation were kept. 36 Schroeder
was the sole management force of the corporation, and voting at the
Grain Company. Victoria Elevator Company was dissolved in July, 1974, and the causes
of action against Meriden and Schroeder were assigned to its successor, Victoria Grain
Company. The court referred to these two companies collectively as "plaintiff." Id at 510
n.1.
29. Id at 510.
30. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also White v. Jorgenson, 322 N.W.2d
607, 608 (Minn. 1982).
31. 283 N.W.2d at 512. Other courts have also found these factors to be significant.
See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 686-87 (4th
Cir. 1976); Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Management, Inc. 519
F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1975) (absence of corporate records); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United
States, 514 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1975) (using the corporation as mere facade), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 923 (1978); TSS Sportswear, Ltd. v. Swank Shop, Inc., 380 F.2d 512 (9th Cir.
1967) (same); Financial Counsellors, Inc. v. SEC, 339 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1965) (nonfunc-
tioning of other officers or directors); Schoenberg v. Benner, 251 Cal. App. 2d 154, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 395 (1967) (non-payment of dividends); Chatterley v. Omnico, Inc., 26 Utah 2d 88,
485 P.2d 667 (1971) (subsidiary corporation actually operated by parent).
32. 283 N.W.2d at 512.
33. Id In White v. Jorgenson, 322 N.W.2d 607, 608 (Minn. 1982), the Minnesota
Supreme Court made it clear that a two-prong test had been adopted in Victoria Elevator.
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meetings by Schroeder and his wife was a mere formality. 3 7 Therefore,
the inference was raised that Schroeder's wife was a non-functioning di-
rector. 38 The court also noted that the corporation paid no dividends.39
These facts led the court to conclude that "[i]t is clear from the evidence
in this case that defendant did not treat the corporation as a separate
entity."40
The court did not indicate the relative weight to be given each of the
eight factors. It may have purposely left the significance of each factor
ambiguous to preserve case-by-case consideration of corporate disregard
cases. Victoria Elevator does, however, establish the narrow proposition
that, in the absence of undercapitalization and fraud, the corporate en-
tity may be disregarded if corporate formalities are not followed or if the
corporation serves primarily as a front for the dealings of shareholders. 4'
The court's adoption of the eight-factor test provides a helpful frame-
work for the analysis of corporate disregard. Prior to Victoria Elevator, the
Minnesota Supreme Court had not developed useful standards for apply-
ing the disregard doctrine.42 Victoria Elevator's significance rests in the
court's succinct statement of evidentiary rules seemingly applicable to all
corporate disregard cases.
The eight factors enumerated in Victoria Elevator are derived from three
separate theories of corporate disregard law. Throughout its struggle
with corporate disregard law, the Minnesota Supreme court has drawn
on the themes of undercapitalization,43 corporate formalities,44 and
fraud.4 5 The guidelines embodied in the eight-factor test should be
viewed as a synthesis of these three theories.
Undercapitalization has been recognized for many years in other juris-
dictions as an important factor in deciding whether to disregard the cor-





41. Id at 512.
42. Note, supra note 1, at 336. The Minnesota Court's varied approach to corporate
disregard law is bewildering. Compare In re Clarke's Will, 204 Minn. 154, 158, 284 N.W.
876, 879 (1939) (alter ego theory utilized based on identity of interest) with Whitney v.
Leighton, 225 Minn. 1, 8, 30 N.W.2d 329, 333 (1947), afdon rehearing, 225 Minn. 12, 30
N.W.2d 339 (1948) (corporate entity disregarded only in instances of fraud) and General
Underwriters, Inc. v. Kline, 223 Minn. 345, 46 N.W.2d 794 (1951) (corporate entity disre-
garded because of failure to follow corporate formalities).
43. See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
44. See infia notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
45. See inf/a notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
46. See Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944); Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc.
v. Havey Fund-Raising Management, Inc., 519 F.2d 634, 638 (8th Cir. 1975); Gordon v.
SS Vedalin, 346 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (D. Md. 1972); Arnold v. Browne, 27 Cal. App. 3d
386, 395-97, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775, 781-83 (1972); Harris v. Curtis, 8 Cal. App. 3d 837, 841-
[Vol. 8
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inadequacy of capital, measured by the nature and magnitude of the
corporate undertaking."4 7 The ictori;a Elevator court expressly stated
that insufficient capitalization is a factor to be considered in corporate
disregard cases.48 It is not clear, however, whether insufficient capitaliza-
tion alone will be sufficient to impose personal liability on shareholders.
In DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co. ,49 upon which
the V'ctoria Elevator court relied, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals sug-
gested that in a case involving a closely-held corporation, undercapital-
ization would be a controlling factor. 5o Undercapitalization also ought
43,87 Cal. Rptr. 614, 617-19 (1970); Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. App. 2d 576, 579-80, 364
P.2d 473, 475, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1961); Loy v. Booth, 16 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1081, 307
N.E.2d 414, 417 (1974).
In Anderson v. Abbott the United States Supreme Court cited to cases in jurisdictions
that had recognized inadequate capitalization as a basis for denying shareholders the pro-
tection of limited liability. The Court included Erickson v. Ontario & Minnesota Power
Co., 134 Minn. 209, 158 N.W. 979 (1916). In Erickson, however, the Minnesota Supreme
Court ostensibly relied on agency principles to hold the defendant parent corporation
liable for damage its subsidiary caused to plaintiff's property. Id at 214, 158 N.W. at 981.
Although the Minnesota court recognized that the corporations were separate legal enti-
ties, it maintained that one corporation can be an agent for another, and that in this case
the subsidiary was an agent for its parent corporation. Id Therefore, agency principles
would dictate visiting liability on the principal/parent corporation for the wrongful con-
duct of the agent/subsidiary. The court failed to indicate how the agency relationship
was created. The decision, however, did contain an extended discussion of the financial
relationship of the corporations that may have been the basis for inclusion of the case in
Anderson. The Erickson court noted that "[b]y the terms of the contract defendant [parent
corporation] agreed to pay, and has paid [to its subsidiary], annually the sum of $4,000 to
maintain the expense of the dam [and reserve to itself exclusive use of the dam and related
property.] No rent or other charge was paid for this exclusive use, and no revenue is
derived therefrom." Id Thus raising the implication that the terms of the agreement
created an undercapitalized subsidiary corporation because it could meet no liabilities
beyond its operating expenses.
Because the Enrckson court purported to impose shareholder liability on agency princi-
ples rather than by disregarding the corporate entity of the subsidiary, the case has raised
more questions than it has settled with respect to the proper role that undercapitalization
should play in relation to corporate disregard law. See Note, supra note 1, at 340-41.
47. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944). Determining what constitutes un-
dercapitalization presents some difficult problems of measurement. Inadequate capitali-
zation for purposes of economic decisions such as entry into business, extension of credit,
or taxation may not be the same as that for holding a shareholder personally liable. There
is also the danger that hindsight will be used in making this determination. Comment,
supra note 5, at 459. Inability to satisfy a judgment is not always indicative of inadequate
capitalization.
48. 283 N.W.2d at 512.
49. 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976).
50. Id at 685. The weight of authority clearly holds that undercapitalization alone is
not sufficient to invoke the remedy of disregard. See, e.g., In re County Green Ltd., 604
F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (noting that single factor will rarely be suffi-
cient to justify drastic remedy of disregarding the corporate entity); Harris v. Curtis, 8 Cal.
App. 3d 837, 841-43, 87 Cal. Rptr. 614, 617-19 (1970); Bartle v. Home Owners Coop.,
Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 106-07, 127 N.E.2d 832, 883 (1955).
1982]
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to be determinative in disregard cases involving tort creditors. Unlike a
party to a breached contract, a tort victim has no opportunity to investi-
gate the financial soundness of a tortfeasor corporation before the com-
mission of the tort.5 1 A contract creditor failing to investigate the
financial soundness of a corporation assumes the risk of doing business
with an undercapitalized corporation.52
The corporate formalities theory of disregard law stresses the prag-
matic concern of preserving the separate legal characteristics of a corpo-
ration.53 The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the importance of
following corporate formalities in Gallagher v. Germania Brewing Co. 54 Gal-
lagher was an action for the price of goods sold and delivered to the de-
fendant corporation. The dominant shareholders of the corporation
intervened and claimed a previously unsatisfied personal judgment
against the assignor of the initial action as a set-off.5 5 The court empha-
sized the nature of a corporation5 6 and held that to allow a set-off would
ignore the principle that a corporation "is an entity separate and distinct
from the body of its shareholders. '"5 7 In dictum, the court stressed the
need to adhere to corporate formalities to keep title to corporate property
free from "complication and uncertainty."5
8
The most consistently applied theory of Minnesota corporate disregard
law has been based on fraudulent shareholder conduct. 59 In Alatchan v.
51. Compare Comment, Altemaive Methods of terring Me Corporate Veil in Contract and Tort
Cases, 48 B.U.L. REV. 123, 138-42 (1968) and Note, supra note 1, at 356-58 with Comment,
supra note 5, at 459 and Note, supra note 1, at 358.
52. Note, supra note 1, at 356-58. It is reasonable to expect that the financial sound-
ness of a party to a contract will be investigated prior to entering into the contractual
relationship. See G.G.C. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 287 N.W.2d 378, 384 (Minn. 1979) ("The
Bank was a consensual and sophisticated creditor of the corporation and should, therefore,
be generally regarded as being able to look out for itself ... ") (citing and quoting Note,
supra note 1).
53. See Gallagher v. Germania Brewing Co., 53 Minn. 214, 219, 54 N.W. 1115, 1116
(1893); see alro Note, supra note 1, at 339-40.
54. 53 Minn. 214, 54 N.W. 1115 (1893).
55. Id at 215, 54 N.W. at 1116.
56. Id at 219, 54 N.W. at 1116.
57. Id
58. Id In a 1951 decision the Minnesota Supreme Court had intimated that failure to
observe formalities was an important consideration in corporate disregard law. See Gen-
eral Underwriters, Inc. v. Kline, 233 Minn. 345, 46 NW.2d 794 (1951) (disregard of cor-
porate entity based, in part, on corporation's failure to keep books of account, corporate
minutes, or separate corporate offices). But see Whitney v. Leighton, 225 Minn. 1, 30
N.W.2d 329 (1947), afdon rehearng, 225 Minn. 12, 30 N.W.2d 335 (1948) (separateness of
corporate entity recognized where failure to observe corporate formalities does not
amount to fraud).
59. See Ahlm v. Rooney, 274 Minn. 259, 143 N.W.2d 65 (1966); Whitney v. Leighton,
255 Minn. 1, 30 N.W.2d 329 (1947), ajfdon rehearing, 255 Minn. 12, 30 N.W.2d 335 (1948);
Fewell v. Tappan, 223 Minn. 483, 27 N.W.2d 648 (1947); Lake Park Dev. Co. v. Paul
Steenberg Constr. Co., 201 Minn. 396, 276 N.W. 651 (1937); Prudential Ins. Co. v. A.
Enkema Holding Co., 196 Minn. 154, 264 N.W. 576 (1936); Matchan v. Phoenix Land
[Vol. 8
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Phoenix Land Investment Co. 60 the Minnesota Supreme Court established
the rule that shareholders may not use the corporate attribute of limited
liability to avoid responsibility for fraudulent acts. 61 In Matchan the
dominant shareholder used a corporation to perpetrate a land fraud
scheme. The court disregarded the corporate entity and held that the
shareholder's fraud was attributable to the corporation.62
Since Matchan, fraud has been the dominant factor in deciding
whether to disregard the corporate entity.6 3 In Whitney v. Le'ghton64 the
Minnesota court expressly held that proof of fraud was necessary to disre-
gard the corporate entity65 and that "in the absence of fraud the corpo-
ration must be treated as a legal entity separate and apart from its
stockholders." 66 Whether the Victoqri Elevator court impliedly overruled
Whitney or simply overlooked it is not clear. In any event, Victoria Eleva-
tor is the first case since Whitney to impose personal liability on share-
holders in favor of corporate creditors in the absence of fraud.67 Victoria
Elevator and its progeny have made it clear that although strict common-
law fraud will remain an important factor, it is not an essential element
in a decision to disregard the corporate entity. 68
Inv. Co., 159 Minn. 132, 198 N.W. 417 (1924); Moe v. Harris, 142 Minn. 442, 172 N.W.
494 (1919). But see Manufacturers Bldg., Inc. v. Heller, 306 Minn. 180, 235 N.W.2d 825
(1975), noted in 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 293 (1977); In re Clarke's Will, 204 Minn. 574,
284 N.W.2d 876 (1939). See generally Note, supra note 1.
60. 159 Minn. 132, 198 N.W. 417 (1924).
61. Id at 138, 198 N.W. at 420.
62. Id
63. See cases cited supra note 59.
64. 225 Minn. 1, 30 N.W.2d 329 (1947).
65. Id at 8, 30 N.W.2d at 333.
66. Id
67. A recent case, Manufacturers Bldg., Inc. v. Heller, 306 Minn. 180, 235 N.W.2d
825 (1975), noted in 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 293 (1977), allowed disregard without a
finding of fraud. Heller, however, involved a dispute among shareholders of a close corpo-
ration and did not involve corporate creditors. This distinction provided the justification
for the Minnesota court's withdrawal from the fraud basis of earlier decisions. See 3 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 293, 295 (1977). The only other instance in which the Minnesota
court disregarded the corporate entity in the absence of fraud was Walsh v. Mankato Oil
Co., 201 Minn. 58, 275 N.W. 377 (1937), a pre-Whitney decision.
68. See 283 N.W.2d at 512 n.5. The Minnesota Supreme Court has addressed the
issue of disregarding a corporate entity four times since its decision in Victorza Elevator
adopting of the two-prong test. See White v. Jorgenson, 322 N.W.2d 607 (Minn. 1981);
Snyder Elec. Co. v. Fleming, 305 N.W.2d 863 (Minn. 1981); G.G.C. Co. v. First Nat'l
Bank of St. Paul, 287 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. 1979). The court cited Victoria Elevator and in
fact relied on the two-prong test in determining whether to disregard the corporate entity
in While, West Concord, and Snyder Electric. In G G. C., which was decided three weeks after
Victoria Elevator, the court alluded to the continued significance of fraud in corporate disre-
gard cases by stating that "[d]isregard of the corporate entity theories is equitable in na-
ture, and generally is not available, absent fraud." 287 N.W.2d at 384 (citing Matchan v.
Phoenix Land Inv. Co., 159 Minn. 32, 198 N.W. 417 (1924)). The court attempted to
explain its holding in G.G..C., which would appear to be contradictory to its earlier deci-
sion in Victoria Elevator, by noting in West Concord that in GG C
19821
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The instrumentality theory and the eight-factor test adopted in Victoria
Elevator integrate the disparate theories of corporate disregard law that
have been applied in earlier Minnesota cases. Emphasis is placed on how
the corporation operated and on the defendant shareholder's relationship
to that operation.69 Because the eight-factor test encompasses so many
facets of corporate behavior, courts should be extremely careful in scruti-
nizing the conduct and shareholder relationships of small closely-held, 70
often family-owned, corporations. In applying the analysis, these corpo-
rations should not be compared to highly structured large publicly-held
corporations. Features that are inherent to small closely-held corpora-
tions should not be the basis for disregarding the corporate entity, absent
substantial evidence that a dominant shareholder is abusing the privilege
of limited liability. 7' Due recognition must be given to the typical char-
acteristics of close corporations 72 to allow them the limited shareholder
liability that is a legitimate and often primary reason for incorporating.
73
this court stated that disregard of the corporate entity is equitable in nature, and
generally not available, absent fraud. However, proof of strict common law
fraud is not required, but, rather, evidence that the corporate entity has operated
as a constructive fraud or in an unjust manner must be presented.
306 N.W.2d at 898 n.3 (citation omitted). The West Concord court, however, did not indi-
cate why it failed to cite or rely on Victoria Ekvator in C.C.C.
69. 283 N.W.2d at 512. The Vitona Elevator court stated that in applying the instru-
mentality theory "courts are concerned with reality and not form, with how the corpora-
tion operated and the individual defendant's relationship to that operation." Id (quoting
DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 541 F.2d 681, 685 (4th Cir.
1976).
70. In a closely-held corporation shares of the corporation are held by a single share-
holder or by a closely-knit group of shareholders. Unlike the publicly-held corporation,
there is no public issue or trading of voting shares. Most close corporations are small
business enterprises whose members desire certain corporate advantages, such as limited
liability, while at the same time preserving many attributes of a sole proprietorship or
partnership. Shareholders in a close corporation are usually active in the conduct and
management of the business. Procedures tend to be simplified and informal. H. HENN,
supra note 1, at 506-07. Because the procedure is less formal and, therefore, subject to
abuse, courts are more likely to disregard the corporate entity in cases involving close
corporations than in those involving publicly-held corporations. See Gillespie, The 7hin
Corporate LIe." Loss of Limited Liability Protection, 45 N.D.L. REV. 363, 378 (1969). See gener-
ally F. O'NEIL, CLOSE CORPORATION LAw AND PRACTICE § 1.09(a) (2d ed. 1971 & Supp.
1977).
71. Gillespie, supra note 70, at 378 & n.61.
72. Closely held corporations typically do not observe strict corporate procedures be-
cause their communications and recordkeeping systems do not require it. Close corpora-
tions generally are not expertly managed and do not have the substantial financial
foundation of public corporations. Also, the corporateness of close corporations should
not be more readily disregarded because they are organizationally similar to partnerships,
which do not enjoy the attribute of limited liability. Id
73. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944).
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